Theta Agent & Endpoint Management
The Theta Agent (theta-agent) is a unified, 2-way Command & Control (C2) endpoint management daemon written in Go for Linux hosts across your home lab, infrastructure, or data center. It connects outbound via a long-lived WebSocket connection to the central SSO Manager (wss://<sso-host>/api/agent/ws), enabling real-time host telemetry, automated host discovery, and local-first administrative management.
Enrollment
An agent is only real if the SSO issued its credential. Tokens the server did not issue are rejected at the WebSocket handshake.
There are two ways to get a host enrolled, and the first is the normal one.
Join key — install the agent and the host appears
Hand the machine a join key and nothing else. On first connect the SSO
enrolls the host, issues it its own per-agent token plus the public key it must
pin, and the agent writes both into its own agent.yml and blanks the join
key. From then on it authenticates as itself.
curl -fsSL https://<SSO_HOST>/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- \
--url "https://<SSO_HOST>" --join-key "tjk_..."
That is the whole procedure — no pre-registering the machine, no copying a
public key by hand. setup.sh mints a key and configures the stack’s own host
this way automatically.
The join key is a bootstrap credential, not the host’s identity. That distinction is what keeps one key convenient without making it a fleet-wide skeleton key: every host still ends up individually revocable, and a compromised host does not yield a credential that works anywhere else.
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|
GET /api/agent/join-keys |
List keys (prefix + usage only; never the key) |
POST /api/agent/join-keys |
Mint one — returned once |
POST /api/agent/join-keys/:id/revoke |
Stop it enrolling new hosts |
DELETE /api/agent/join-keys/:id |
Remove it |
Revoking a join key does not disconnect hosts that already joined; they hold their own tokens by then. Revoke the agent itself to cut a specific host off.
Pre-registering a host
When you want the agent bound to a specific Directory host up front, enroll it from Directory → Install Agent:
- Give the agent a name and bind it to a host resource. The binding is what links telemetry, status and commands to a Directory entry.
- Press Enroll & issue token. The SSO mints a 256-bit token, stores only its SHA-256, and shows the raw value once.
- Copy the generated install command — it already carries the token and the server’s public key.
A host that self-enrolls with a join key arrives unbound; bind it afterwards with
PUT /api/agent/nodes/:id or from the Directory.
Or via the API:
curl -X POST https://<SSO_HOST>/api/agent/enroll \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin-api-token>" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name": "web01", "resourceId": "<host-resource-uuid>"}'
The response contains token (once only) and publicKey.
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|
GET /api/agent/nodes |
Every enrolled agent, connected or not, plus the server public key |
POST /api/agent/enroll |
Mint an agent + token |
PUT /api/agent/nodes/:id |
Rename, or bind/unbind the host resource |
POST /api/agent/nodes/:id/rotate |
Issue a new token; the old one stops working immediately |
POST /api/agent/nodes/:id/revoke |
Disable the enrollment |
DELETE /api/agent/nodes/:id |
Remove the enrollment |
POST /api/agent/nodes/:id/command |
Send a command (signed automatically when high-risk) |
Revoke, rotate and delete drop any live connection immediately — they do not wait for the agent to reconnect. Commands are addressed by agent id, never by token: a token is a credential and has no business in a URL or a log.
Enrollment, revocation, rotation, every command, and every rejected connection
are written to the application log as structured "component":"agent" records
with the acting user.
Lost the token? It cannot be recovered — only its hash is stored. Rotate the agent to issue a new one.
Core Functionality
1. Host Discovery & Inventory
Upon establishing a WebSocket connection, the agent immediately pushes a comprehensive discovery payload:
- Hostname & Network Interfaces: Hostname and all non-loopback IPv4 addresses and MACs.
- Operating System & Kernel: Linux distribution, platform, and kernel version.
- Hardware Specs: CPU model, total RAM (GB), and total root disk capacity (GB).
- Physical Location: Location identifier string (e.g.
dc-01-rack-12) configured inagent.yml.
If the agent detects a network IP change, it automatically re-pushes an updated discovery payload to the SSO Manager.
2. Real-Time Telemetry Streaming
Every 30 seconds, the agent streams real-time performance metrics:
- CPU Load: System-wide CPU utilization percentage.
- Memory Utilization: RAM usage percentage and available memory.
- Disk Utilization: Root filesystem usage percentage.
- ZFS Storage Health: Health status of ZFS pools (e.g.,
ONLINE). - NVIDIA GPU Load: GPU compute utilization percentage (via
nvidia-smi).
Viewing in the SSO Manager
Agent status and telemetry live on the Directory page — there is no separate Agents page. For each host resource that has a connected theta-agent, the Directory shows a status dot in the row:
| Color | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Green | Connected, healthy (CPU/RAM/disk within limits). |
| Yellow | Connected but under high load (CPU > 80% or RAM > 80% or disk > 90%). |
| Red | Enrolled but not connected. The agent exists and is expected — this is a fault. |
| Grey | No agent enrolled for this host, the enrollment is revoked, or the agent service is unreachable. |
Red and grey used to be the same colour, which made an ordinary directory of hosts look like an outage. Because the enrollment now outlives the connection, “installed but down” is distinguishable from “never had an agent”.
Opening a host’s resource modal reveals a Metrics tab with the agent’s live telemetry (CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU) and discovery info (OS, kernel, IPs, location).
An agent attaches to its host by its enrollment binding (resourceId), set
when you enroll it or later via PUT /api/agent/nodes/:id. Agents enrolled
without a binding fall back to matching their reported hostname against the
resource name — the old behaviour, kept only as a fallback, because it silently
failed whenever a Directory name differed from the machine’s hostname and
aliased two hosts that happened to share one.
Agent discovery feeds the Directory
A bound agent’s discovery payload is written onto its host resource (os,
kernel, cpu, ram_total_gb, disk_total_gb, ip), tagged with
discovery_sources: ["theta-agent"] and an agentId back-reference. An agent
runs on the host it describes, so it is the most authoritative source the
directory has. An unbound agent goes through the normal discovery reconciler
instead, matching like any other source.
Local-First Security & Capability Matrix
To protect hosts against unauthorized control, theta-agent enforces a strict, local-first capability matrix defined in /etc/theta42/agent.yml. Central SSO Manager requests are checked against local configuration before execution; permissions cannot be overridden remotely.
| Capability | Config Key | Risk Level | Description & Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telemetry | telemetry |
Safe | Streams read-only system metrics (CPU, RAM, Disk, ZFS, GPU). |
| Configure LDAP | configure_ldap |
Moderate | Writes updated SSSD configuration to /etc/sssd/sssd.conf & restarts sssd. |
| Service Control | service_control |
High | Restarts systemd services listed in an explicit allowlist (e.g., ["nginx", "docker", "sssd"]). |
| Reboot | reboot |
High | Triggers an immediate system reboot (systemctl reboot). |
| Arbitrary Bash | arbitrary_bash |
Critical | Executes raw bash scripts sent from the SSO Manager as root (used for automated GitOps). |
High-Risk Command Verification (Protocol v1.2.0)
High-risk management commands (reboot, service_restart, configure_ldap, arbitrary_bash, update_binary) are cryptographically verified using Ed25519 signatures:
- The SSO Manager canonicalizes the command payload (sorted keys, no whitespace,
no HTML escaping,
signatureomitted). - The payload is signed with the SSO Manager’s Ed25519 private key.
- The Base64 signature is appended to the message payload.
- The agent verifies the signature against the configured
public_keyin/etc/theta42/agent.ymlbefore executing the action.
The signing key is persistent. It lives in OpenBao at
secret/agent/signing-key and survives restarts, so the public_key you pin in
agent.yml keeps matching. (It used to be generated in memory at boot and
changed on every restart, which made pinning impossible.) If the SSO cannot load
or store a key it refuses to send high-risk commands rather than signing with
one no agent has seen — GET /api/agent/nodes reports this as
signingAvailable: false.
This requires the sso-broker OpenBao policy to grant secret/agent/*. Re-run
./setup.sh from theta-suite if you are upgrading.
Verification is fail-closed on the agent. An agent with no public_key
configured rejects every high-risk command. Earlier versions logged “skipping
signature verification” and executed them, so an agent installed without a key
would run reboot, configure_ldap and arbitrary_bash unverified.
Installation & Deployment
Quick One-Liner Install
Run the following command as root on the target Linux host:
curl -fsSL https://<SSO_HOST>/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- \
--url "https://<SSO_HOST>" --token "<ISSUED_TOKEN>" --public-key "<BASE64_PUBLIC_KEY>"
Both values come from enrollment. The Install Agent modal builds this line
for you with them already filled in. Omitting --public-key leaves the agent
able to report telemetry but unable to accept any high-risk command.
Custom Config Wizard
You can generate a Base64-encoded custom configuration using the Install Agent button on the Directory Management page in the SSO Manager UI:
curl -fsSL https://<SSO_HOST>/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- "<BASE64_ENCODED_CONFIG>"
Configuration File Example (/etc/theta42/agent.yml)
# /etc/theta42/agent.yml
server_url: "wss://sso.example.com"
# Issued by the SSO. Left empty when installing with a join key -- the agent
# fills it in itself once the server enrolls it.
auth_token: "c8181ce0e55bf7302b11d719a7ae39adcd7604de461e6e363f8bb4fadf126acb"
# Bootstrap credential. Used only while auth_token is empty, and blanked by the
# agent once it has its own token.
join_key: ""
location: "dc-01-rack-12"
# Base64 of the RAW 32-byte Ed25519 public key -- exactly the `publicKey` value
# from enrollment or GET /api/agent/nodes. Not a PEM body: a base64-decoded
# SPKI blob is 44 bytes, the agent requires 32, and it will refuse every signed
# command if this is wrong.
public_key: "D0cJB3iuStTzhXlu7tFDh/eEXFxRZwkuwQJJhFSqwlQ="
capabilities:
telemetry: true
configure_ldap: true
reboot: false
service_control: ["nginx", "docker", "sssd"]
arbitrary_bash: false
Troubleshooting: agent is rejected (close 4001)
If the agent logs that the server rejected its token, the enrollment — not the network — is the problem. The SSO accepts the WebSocket upgrade and then closes with an application code:
| Code | Meaning | Fix |
|---|---|---|
4001 |
Token unknown, or never issued by this server | Enroll the host and put the issued token in agent.yml |
4002 |
Superseded — another connection authenticated as this agent | Normal; two copies of the agent are running |
4003 |
Enrollment revoked or deleted | Re-enroll |
4004 |
Token rotated; agent.yml has the old value |
Copy the new token |
The agent backs off for 5 minutes on 4001/4003/4004 rather than retrying
every 5 seconds — a credential that is wrong will not fix itself, and hammering
the SSO only floods its audit log.
An agent installed before protocol v1.2.0 carries a token generated in the
browser that the server never recorded, so it will be rejected with 4001 until
re-enrolled. The quickest fix is to put a join key in its agent.yml as
join_key and blank auth_token — it will re-enroll itself on the next
reconnect.
Troubleshooting: agent can’t connect (dial tcp ... i/o timeout)
If the agent host logs Dial error: dial tcp <ip>:443: i/o timeout while
connecting to wss://<sso-host>/api/agent/ws, the WebSocket path is usually
fine — this is a network/NAT problem, not an agent or SSO bug. A host behind
the same NAT that owns the SSO often cannot reach its own public IP (no
hairpin/loopback NAT on many home routers), so the TCP dial times out even
though the same address works from outside.
Fix options:
- Point
agent.ymlserver_urlat an address the host can reach directly — e.g. the SSO host’s LAN IP (http://<lan-ip>orhttp://<lan-ip>:3001for a no-TLS direct path). - Enable NAT reflection / hairpin NAT on the router so LAN hosts can reach their own public IP:443.
- Add a local route/firewall rule on the agent host for its public IP.
Note: on a deployment where the theta42 proxy fronts
sso.suite.example, make sure the proxy has a persistent Host record for the real SSO domain — not just thelocaltest.meplaceholder — so routing survives a proxy restart (an in-memory lookup cache can mask a missing Redis record for up to ~1h).